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RISE AND FALL AND RISE...SOUTH CAROLINA’S MARITIME HISTORY
South Carolina’s maritime trade has ridden a roller coaster of success and failure.
GEORGETOWN PORT
The Georgetown port, once stymied by silting, continues its revival.
MARITIME TRADE RESUSCITATED
South Carolina’s maritime trade is thriving,but now the challenge is to stay on top.
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Patrick Cook, living history coordinator for the S.C. State Park Service, climbs a shroud on the
Adventure moored at Charles Town Landing State Historic Site, “South Carolina’s
Birthplace.” This wooden reproduction 17th-century vessel will undergo a major rebuilding in
2003 and 2004. Site visitors can learn about the maritime heritage of Charleston and the skills
of early Carolinians. Call (843) 852-4200 for more information. PHOTO/WADE SPEES
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OFF LIMITS. Port proponent David Blair opens the gate to land near
Charleston that the State Ports Authority acquired a decade ago. The land
has remained undeveloped after community activists fought port expansion on
Daniel Island. PHOTO/WADE SPEES
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South Carolina’s maritime trade has ridden spectacular heights and plumbed poverty-stricken depths.
BIG RIG. A container ship docks at the Wando Welch Terminal in Charleston harbor. PHOTO/WADE SPEES
In 1940, the grand old city slumbered. Charleston wasknown as “buzzard town” because of the vulturescircling slowly over the city dump. Visitors com-
plained about the terrible smell wafting down from
fertilizer plants that processed fish and chemicals
north of the city. At the port of Charleston, wharves
and warehouses rotted, and ship hulls decayed on
undredged mud flats. Most days, the harbor was eerily
quiet, the channel between Fort Moultrie and Fort
Sumter empty of ship traffic, as waves slapped against
tugboats in their berths.
Charleston and its port had been deteriorating for
decades. A New York consultant studied the port’s
prospects in 1921. “Most of the Charleston waterfront,”
reported Edward J. Clapp, “is wholly useless save as an
historical relic.” The city’s economy was not much better.
The port limped on after World War II despite vast
federal sums poured into the nearby Charleston Navy
Yard. Throughout the 1950s, Charleston was “still a
backwater port,” says Thomas Larry Young, vice-
president of Stevedoring Services of America, a privately
owned builder of shipping terminals. In 1959, Young
started working part-time on the docks at the age of 15.
Young remembers when stevedores held second jobs
because the docks couldn’t provide enough work. “Long-
shoremen got a couple of calls a week, and that was it.”
This was a humiliation for the once-famous port city
that had dominated maritime trade in the American
South in colonial and early antebellum days.
From the 1730s to the early 1800s—the golden age of
deep-water sailing ships—South Carolina’s plantation
economy thrived on maritime global trade and the
hundreds of ocean-borne vessels that docked in Charles-
ton each year to load rice and cotton for European
markets. International trade spawned the wealth that
built the grand historic homes and gardens of Charleston,
Beaufort, and Georgetown.
Charleston and the lowcountry grew rich in the
eighteenth century largely due to favorable trade winds in
the North Atlantic Basin. Since Columbus’s early
voyages, mariners had known that prevailing winds blow
in a circular, clock-wise fashion around the North
Atlantic. Seamen of this era rarely traveled due west from
Europe across the Atlantic to the New World; they would
have headed into the wind’s teeth. Besides, square-rigged
merchant vessels were unsuited to tacking upwind. Squat
and slow, designed to carry heavy cargo, they needed wind
at their backs.
By John H. Tibbetts
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A merchant vessel sailing
roundtrip from London to the
English American colonies would
first travel southwest to the Azores,
west of Portugal. Next, trade winds
would then carry the ship along the
southerly route across the Atlantic
toward the West Indies; this was the
same path that Columbus took to
America.
The ship might pause at an
English West Indian port-of-
call. England enjoyed lucra-
tive commerce with its sugar
colonies in the Caribbean. Or
the ship might pass straight
through the West Indies to
the Florida Keys, where the
captain would turn north,
following the Gulf Stream
along the eastern shoreline of
North America.
If a ship were aimed for
New York or Boston or
Philadelphia, the vessel might
stop at Charleston to take on
food and supplies or load and
unload cargo.
 Charleston was a
primary North American
destination for English ships. After
trading in Charleston, a ship would
sail up to Cape Hatteras before
veering northeast across the Atlan-
tic to Europe. This transatlantic
route, historian George C. Rogers
pointed out, “was a great circle and
Charleston was on its western edge.”
By the 1720s, the slave trade
from Africa to Carolina also
flourished. European ships traveled
to West Africa, where they picked
up slaves and sailed for the New
World. From 1716 to 1807, the Holy
City was the port-of-entry for an
estimated 121,500 slaves, about 22
percent of all slaves legally brought
into North America, according to
William S. Pollitzer, a professor
emeritus of anatomy and anthropol-
ogy at the University of North
Carolina. Ships from South Caro-
lina carried rice, cotton, and other
goods back to Europe.
In the years before the Ameri-
can Revolution, Charleston was the
fourth largest city in British North
America but easily the richest. Its
wealth dominated the rest of the raw
southern outback, with perhaps the
exception of Virginia. Visitors were
awed by the city’s glittering society.
Beginning in the early nine-
teenth century, however, the
lowcountry’s prosperity faltered.
Ports competed fiercely for new
business, and New York and other
northern cities won at Charleston’s
expense.
Charleston’s decline as a major
international seaport came surpris-
ingly quickly. Decades before the
Civil War, the city was on the
defensive, fighting abolitionist
criticism and northerners’ vigor and
business savvy. Lowcountry planters,
rich and self-satisfied, were deter-
mined to keep modern ideas and
influences at bay. Charleston became
an increasingly insular place, more of
an aristocratic playground than a
thriving city.
From the 1730s, when Charles-
ton blossomed into a major port,
until 1800, when the city began to
fade, it was transformed, wrote
Rogers, from a place “that had
looked outward to one that hence-
forth looked inward.”
SUGAR AND RICE
Founded as a British colony in
1670, Charleston soon became a
maritime trading partner and
cultural heir of the hugely profitable
British West Indian sugar colonies.
During the 1620s, English
colonialists built rough new settle-
ments in the Caribbean islands,
including Barbados, St. Christopher,
and Nevis. At first, the English
adventurers barely scratched out a
living. But in the 1640s, sugar cane
was introduced into Barbados, and
sugar quickly became the island’s
most important export. European
consumers lapped up the sweetener
and its byproducts rum and
molasses. Within 20 years, a small
Barbadian elite gained control of
the most productive land, becom-
ing spectacularly wealthy.
 The Barbadians were the first
English colonialists to exploit
African slaves on a massive, brutal
scale to produce a cash crop for
export. Within a generation, other
British West Indian colonies
followed the Barbadian economic
blueprint, as did the next important
new settlement on the North
American continent: Charles Town.
By the middle of the seven-
teenth century, western European
monarchs were sponsoring colonies
in North America. Monarchs offered
land grants to developers who would
finance settlements, exploit natural
resources, and gain profits through
sea trading.
In 1665, King Charles II of
England granted a charter to the
Absolute and True Lords Proprietors
for control of the new colony of
Carolina. The Lords Proprietors—
eight well-connected Englishmen—
invested in Carolina’s first perma-
nent settlement christened
Albermarle Point, soon renamed
Charles Town. Most new immigrants
were poor people from England and
Barbados. Within a year wealthy
Barbadian sugar planters and their
PAST TIES. During the antebellum era, Charleston’s
maritime trade spawned demand for slave artisans,
including ropemakers, carpenters, and shipwrights.
PHOTO/WADE SPEES
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BREEZE WAY. Trade winds helped Charleston
become rich in the eighteenth century. Sailors
knew that prevailing winds blow in a circular,
clock-wise direction around the North Atlantic.
Ships traveling from England to North America
took the southerly route through the West Indies
to Charleston. Even ships headed for New York or
Boston usually stopped in Charleston to pick up
food, supplies, or load and unload cargo.
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BYGONE DAYS. This engraving provides a view of the Cooper River waterfront of the late 1730s, when the lowcountry’s maritime trade surged.
PHOTO/COURTESY OF CHARLESTON MUSEUM
slaves also arrived in Charles
Town to escape the constant
threat of slave revolt, hurricanes,
and disease epidemics in the
Caribbean.
Carolina settlers searched for
commodities to sell to Europe and
the West Indies, and the new port
was the center of the colony’s
economy. Colonialists bartered
with Indians, offering trinkets,
cloth, and hatchets for deerskins
and beaver skins. Carolina
exported animal pelts to furriers
and hatmakers throughout
Europe. Settlers and their slaves
harvested naval stores from
coastal forests—turpentine, pitch,
lumber, tar, and staves—and
raised cattle in the longleaf woods.
By the mid-1670s, settlers
traded meat, lumber, and Indian
slaves to the West Indies for
black slaves, rum, sugar, and
trinkets. Colonialists shipped
lucrative naval stores to England
for the growing ship building
industry. In return, the new
colony received English manufac-
tured goods. In 1683, a French
Huguenot settler remarked that
“the port is never without ships
and the country is becoming a
great traffic center.”
South Carolina’s maritime
traders found dramatic success in
the early eighteenth century after
lowcountry settlers discovered their
most profitable cash crop: rice.
The demand for South Caro-
lina rice was greatest in northern
Europe. Most Americans were not
rice consumers, so “Carolina Gold”
rice was produced for overseas
markets. By the 1720s, more than
half of the value of all of the
colony’s exports came from the rice
trade. A decade later, 500 deep-sea
vessels a year sailed into
Charleston’s port to trade. In 1739,
eight privately owned wharves had
been built from Bay Street into
the Cooper River to serve the
shipping industry.
Georgetown, founded in 1730,
officially became a port the follow-
ing year, though it remained a tiny
village until after the Revolution.
The Beaufort-Port Royal area,
though, grew rapidly just before the
Revolution. But Charleston always
dominated the coast politically and
economically.
 Lowcountry South Carolina
was not a complete maritime society
like coastal Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut. Most
South Carolinians looked inland,
not to sea. “In the Northeast, if you
lived near the coast, your livelihood
was connected to the water,” says
Charlie Sneed, executive director of
the S.C. Maritime Heritage Founda-
tion. “In our part of the country,
people were more likely to make their
living in farming and plantations.”
Charleston was blessed with an
excellent harbor, yet South Carolin-
ians built and invested in few seagoing
vessels. Instead, they depended on
ships owned by Londoners or
Bostonians. New Englanders increas-
ingly dominated American shipbuild-
ing and maritime investing.
Bostonians bought vessel shares in the
way that modern investors buy
corporate stock shares.
P.C. Coker, an independent
scholar of local maritime history, has
described the thinking of a typical
colonial Carolina merchant who had
1,200 pounds to invest in the 1730s.
With that sum, a merchant could build
and outfit a 200-ton seagoing vessel,
but he would risk his investment with
storms, wars, fires, groundings, and
pirates. Or he could pour his money
into a dozen slaves and a 500-acre
plantation, where he could grow rice
and indigo, which fetched high prices.
The choice was simple: purchase
slaves and a plantation and charter
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someone else’s ship to send
produce to Europe.
CAROLINA’S SHIPBUILDERS
Although South Carolinians
built a small number of ocean-
going ships, they constructed
thousands of shallow-draft vessels
that plied lowcountry rivers and
coastal waters.
Settlers needed reliable vessels
built for local conditions, quickly
realizing that deep-draft European
ships were impractical in shallow
waters behind sea islands. It was
costly and time-consuming to saw
planks for small European-style
vessels. So they learned from
Indians how to use dugout crafts
from the plentiful bald cypress trees
along coastal waterways. The
dugout, writes shipbuilder and
author William C. Fleetwood, Jr.,
was the Model T of colonial
ships—“seemingly everywhere and
used for every purpose.”
By the 1720s, colonialists
modified dugout crafts—called
periaguas—to move goods
downriver from Indian trading posts
to coastal towns. At first, the
periagua was a flat-bottomed, fairly
narrow barge with a hull made from
two cypress logs. Four to six men,
usually slaves hired from their
owners, rowed the typical periagua.
There was a small cabin aft for
stowing valuables; trade goods
were covered by tarpaulin. On
tidal waters near the coast,
periaguas used sails. In the 1760s,
boat builders made larger periaguas
with live oak framing members
and wide pine plank. More than
100 barrels of rice, each weighing
about 560 pounds, could be
transported by one of the bigger
periaguas.
The boats and canoes of the
lowcountry were crewed primarily
by slaves. Slave watermen enjoyed
considerable autonomy from their
masters. Slaves were also crew and
often captains of plantation-
owned vessels that sailed coastal
waters. Watermen could stay out
of sight of their masters for long
periods. Traveling throughout the
lowcountry, slave bondsmen made
extra money by trading goods
with field hands and other
plantation slaves.
Many large plantations had
their own shipyards for vessel
construction and repair. At first,
planters hired European shipwrights
to build primarily sloops and
schooners. Colonial sloops and
schooners were nimble, easy-to-
maneuver, relatively small vessels—
ideal for shoal-infested coastal
waters. In the mid-eighteenth
century, the typical schooner
weighed about 20 tons. By compari-
son, the Friendship, one of the
largest ocean-going ships built in
South Carolina before the Revolu-
tion, weighed 260 tons.
Schooners were used for coastal
transportation and trading and later
for trips to the Caribbean and South
America but not for transatlantic
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voyages. According to Coker, about
140 schooners were registered and
built in the Charles Town area
between 1735 and 1760. Meanwhile,
32 ocean-going ships were registered,
though some were not built here,
having been captured from French and
Spanish privateers.
 Planters often hired out their
slaves as carpenters and other trades-
men. European shipwrights taught
slave apprentices, who became skilled
shipwrights themselves and trained
other slaves. White artisans, however,
complained that slave artisans were
too prevalent in South Carolina,
depressing wages and making jobs
scarce. In 1744, Andrew Ruck peti-
tioned the Carolina Commons House
of Assembly for relief from the large
number of slaves “employed in
mending, repairing, and caulking
ships. . .and working at the
Shipwright’s Trade.” In 1751, the
Assembly placed a tax on imported
slaves, and one-fifth of the revenue
was used as a bounty to encourage
shipwrights to move to South Caro-
lina. But three years later, the state
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RUSH HOUR. This 1856 illustration of Charleston shows an oar-powered plantation boat (lower
left), a topsail schooner, and a side-wheel, ocean-going steamer.
PHOTO/COURTESY OF LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
dropped the bounty because
Charleston was prospering and
shipwrights were moving in from
Europe and New England.
Before the Revolution, four
active shipyards were located in
the Charles Town vicinity,
including the largest at Hobcaw
Creek, a deep-water site across the
Cooper River from the city.
Port Royal enjoyed its
maritime glory years before the
American Revolution as the most
important shipbuilding site in the
southern colonies. Port Royal
shipbuilders had access to excel-
lent timber, particularly live oak,
invaluable for use in curved
structural parts of ships such as
framing. But the Revolution
devastated the Port Royal-
Beaufort area, and recovery was
slow. Moreover, Port Royal was
situated far from the center of
economic life in Charleston,
hampering its growth.
By 1800, South Carolina’s
shipbuilding industry could not
compete with New England’s.
Slaves on large South Carolina
plantations probably did most of
the ship repair and construction.
Free artisans, who could not work as
cheaply as slaves, migrated to
northern shipbuilding cities. Some
Carolina shipyards shut down,
victims of slaveholders’ dominion
over labor and capital.
DECLINE AND FALL
By 1800, Charleston was
steadily losing maritime trade to
other cities. Greater precision in
navigation and improved vessels
allowed ship captains to sail directly
from Europe to New York. Ships no
longer had to travel the southerly
route via the Caribbean and
Charleston. The faster transatlantic
route between New York and Europe
left Charleston out of the loop.
 Many British and New
England merchant firms in the
1820s began avoiding Charleston
because free black seamen could not
enter the city without a hefty bond
being posted.
 New Orleans meanwhile grew
fabulously rich by trading produce
pouring down the Mississippi and
Ohio rivers. Every major port on the
eastern seaboard, hungry for a piece
of that action, sought to extend
transportation networks to the
west. But the Appalachians
blocked the efforts of mer-
chants who wanted to move
goods east over the mountains
to sell to the world.
New York was the first
eastern seaport to skirt the
Appalachians. In 1825, the
Erie Canal was completed
from the Hudson River at
Albany to Buffalo on Lake
Erie. This massive public-
works project allowed barges
to travel from the Great Lakes
to the Erie Canal to the
Hudson River and south to
New York. Hence the Erie
Canal was the first waterway
linkage between an Atlantic
port and the agricultural lands
beyond the mountains. New
York became the primary trading
linkage between Europe and the
northern Ohio River Valley. The Erie
Canal caused an explosion of wealth in
the country’s northern tier, creating
closer economic and social ties between
the Great Lakes and the northeastern
states. Philadelphia and Baltimore soon
followed suit, creating transportation
links through the mountains.
South Carolina’s leaders also
sought to improve waterway connec-
tions from inland areas to Charleston.
In 1800, the Santee Canal connected
the Santee River to the headwaters of
the Cooper River. As a result, the
interior country’s crops were brought
downstream to Charleston, but this
cut off the Georgetown port’s poten-
tial growth. Interior farms and planta-
tions once served by Georgetown’s
port now sent their produce to
Charleston. But the Santee Canal was
plagued by low water levels and by
1840 it was out of business.
 In 1818, the General Assembly
provided special appropriations to build
eight canals linking waterways in
nearly every district in the state.
Political decisions, however, trumped
engineering analyses, and poor routes
were selected. The public wouldn’t use
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the canals, so revenues could not
pay for lockkeepers’ salaries. By
1838 six of the eight canals were
abandoned, according to Walter
Edgar, a historian at the University
of South Carolina.
In the 1820s, the upstart
Savannah port was growing
rapidly at Charleston’s expense,
benefiting from steamboats loaded
with cotton coming down the
Savannah River. But Charleston
fought back. In 1827, the state
chartered the South Carolina
Canal and Railroad Company,
and over the next six years it laid
track from Hamburg in the
Edgefield District to Charleston.
The idea was to draw Savannah
River cotton traffic to the
Charleston seaport, a route of 136
miles, at that time the world’s
longest railroad under a single
management.
Yet the conservative
lowcountry elite, determined to
maintain Charleston as an elegant
retreat, outlawed steam engines
within the city limits. “People in
Charleston didn’t want the noise of
the engines downtown,” says Edgar.
The railway tracks therefore
stopped cold at Line Street. It was a
self-destructive ordinance. At a
costly surcharge, freight had to be
transferred from rail cars to wagons,
then hauled through the city to the
waterfront. “Every time you handle
cargo, you (drive) up the price of
it,” notes Edgar. Savannah, by
contrast, allowed a railway built
directly to its waterfront.
When South Carolina rice and
cotton dominated the marketplace,
Charleston enjoyed its greatest
success. In 1821, South Carolina
was the leading cotton-producing
state. On the eve of the Civil War,
however, it had fallen to seventh.
Productive lands had opened up in
Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi,
then Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Texas. Cotton from the new
southwest was shipped via Mobile
and New Orleans instead of
Charleston. Meanwhile, lowcountry
rice planters faced competition from
Burma, Bengal, Java, and other rice-
growing European colonies.
Before the Civil War, South
Carolina failed to build a railroad
link to the South beyond the
Appalachians. “People talked about
it, they dreamed about it,” says
Edgar. “But it was never completed.”
A healthy port, after all, must
rely on a thriving hinterland and an
effective transportation network to
feed it. Hemp grown in eastern
Kentucky, for example, was used to
bundle southern cotton. But to reach
South Carolina, the hemp had to be
HEAVY LOAD. Dockworkers, in this undated photograph, moved cotton from a railcar to prepare it for export. Charleston had its greatest
political and economic leverage when South Carolina cotton and rice dominated the marketplace. But South Carolina faded as a cotton producer
after 1820 and as a rice producer after the Civil War. Cotton, however, remained the state’s leading money crop until the mid-1950s, when it was
outpaced by tobacco. PHOTO/COURTESY OF S.C. STATE PORTS AUTHORITY
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sent north by rail to the Great
Lakes, by barge to New York, and
then by coastwise vessels to
Charleston. In this era, “New York
has a hinterland that stretches west
to Indiana” and into the South
itself, says Scott Reynolds Nelson,
a historian at the College of
William & Mary. “South Carolina
has a hinterland that doesn’t get to
Tennessee.”
In the mid-1840s, Charleston
repealed its restriction against
steam engines within the city, but
railroad tracks still stopped at the
edge of town. By then, the port had
lost its edge. “Charleston was seen
as a terrible port starting in the
1840s,” says Nelson. Its shallow
harbor could not accommodate the
new transatlantic steamships with
deep drafts. The most sophisticated
shipping merchants and technolo-
gies were found in the North.
About 60 percent of South
Carolina’s exports had to be sent in
the coastwise trade to New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, and Balti-
more, where the major transatlan-
tic lines were located.
The least industrialized major
city in the United States in the late
antebellum years, Charleston,
travelers noticed, lacked the verve
and energy of other seaports.
Lowcountry planters held anti-
business attitudes, with the
exception of agricultural com-
merce. A southern gentleman made
his money in agriculture and
owned slaves. A gentleman did not
own textile factories—thus
benefiting from the South’s leading
export—and hire white workers
who could upset the order of a
slave society.
By contrast, Yankee entrepre-
neurs in this era got rich by
shrewdly adding value to raw
materials carried by rail and river
into their ports. New York, for
example, built grain mills and
became the flour capital of
North America.
HITTING BOTTOM
 The Civil War ravaged the South’s
rural economy, and for years the region
had little to export. Charleston’s network
of private wharves rotted in neglect, later
to be damaged by fires, major hurricanes,
and a catastrophic earthquake. In 1885, a
major hurricane smashed the Cooper
River waterfront, destroying piers,
wharves, offices, and vessels.
By 1881, northern financiers
purchased the bankrupt South Carolina
Railroad. Rails were extended—finally—
through Charleston’s streets to the
waterfront. Northern syndicates pur-
chased other bankrupt South Carolina
railroads and completed links between
the Northeast and the Southeast.
Holding monopoly power over rail
transport in the state, northern finan-
ciers manipulated freight rates for the
benefit of New York trading interests.
Sending a bale of cotton via rail to New
York cost three times less than to
Charleston. During the 1890s, the
volume of trade handled by the Charles-
ton port dropped from $98.5 million to
$29.5 million.
Yankees, however, were not to
blame for Charleston’s troubles. An
elderly, hidebound leadership stymied
the city’s development. “They were older
men, and the way things were done 40 to
50 years earlier was good enough for
them,” says Edgar. “They didn’t want to
change anything.” City leaders refused to
invest in infrastructure improvements. It
took the federal government, for
example, to pay for deepening the
harbor’s shipping channel in 1878.
The phosphate trade was important
to both Port Royal and Charleston after
the Civil War. Charleston and
Georgetown also exported vast amounts
of lumber products to the Northeast.
Until World War I, despite advances in
steel ships and steam power, some
shipping companies still used schooners
for the coastwise trade. Schooners
carried bulk, low-grade commodities
such as New England ice, Middle
Atlantic coal, southern “hard” pine,
naval stores, and phosphate ore.
Charleston’s port continued in the
deep minor leagues through World
War I. The city could not escape
discriminatory rail freight rates, and its
leadership was paralyzed. Railroad
systems with financial interests in the
ports of Savannah, Norfolk, Mobile,
and New Orleans had acquired
Charleston’s wharves, warehouses, and
cargo-handling equipment, which
continued to decay. Railroad syndi-
cates funneled business to Charleston’s
competitors. Some lowcountry
politicians tried to stem the port’s
downward spiral. Battles erupted
between the still-powerful planter
class that sought stasis and a business
community that wanted to rebuild
Charleston into an international
port city.
In the 1920s, Charleston Mayor
John P. Grace tried to jump-start the
port. Under his leadership, the city
purchased waterfront property and
equipment, repaired wharves, and
pursued new business. The tonnage and
dollar value of cargo handled through
the port doubled during the decade.
But Charleston remained a third-
rate port handling bulk cargo, the least
valuable of seaborne shipments. It
required more than 200 longshoremen,
sometimes working for a week, to
unload or load a single ship. Laborers
used shovels, picks, big hooks, and
oversized wheelbarrows called “Geor-
gia buggies” to move bulk cargo from
ship to boxcar. Bulk cargo included
Peruvian guano, bone meal, and fish
scraps. “After you worked a day
unloading fish scraps. . .you stank
something terrible,” reminisced retired
port worker John Harleston.
 In the 1930s, the Depression killed
Charleston’s gains during the previous
decade. “When the Depression hit and
no ships came into the port for about
six months, we almost starved to
death,” Harleston said.
 Charleston limped on through the
1930s, dreaming of its glorious past—
only to be awakened at mid-twentieth
century by World War II and a resur-
gent, industrializing South.
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HANDLE WITH CARE. During the first half of the twentieth century, Charleston handled mostly low-grade,
bulk cargo such as fertilizer, lumber, coal, and petroleum products. But by the 1950s, the port began to
graduate to break-bulk cargo, including packaged products (cotton bales, plywood, cases of fruit), cars,
machinery, and farm equipment. Handling break-bulk cargo required skill, and black longshoremen, one of the
few organized labor groups in the state, were well-paid, holding positions of respect in their community.
PHOTO/COURTESY OF S.C. STATE PORTS AUTHORITY
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Georgetown port
Some of the richest
families in North America in
the years before the Civil War
lived in the Georgetown area.
Yet during the region’s
greatest prosperity,
Georgetown’s port on
Winyah Bay remained an
adjunct of Charleston’s.
Each year a fleet of vessels
from New England would sail
down to haul Georgetown’s
rice to market in Charleston
or New York.
Georgetown’s port was
stymied by silt. In 1838, a
survey showed that Winyah
Bay’s passage to sea was
crooked, difficult to navigate,
and only seven and one-half
feet at low tide, too shallow
for oceangoing ships. So it
remained a secondary port
for coastal trading.
 After the war, George-
town’s rice plantations never
completely recovered. Over
the next 50 years, South
Carolina rice planting died out
from repeated hurricanes and
competition from other rice-
growing areas.
But the Georgetown area’s
lumbering business remained
an important mainstay for
workers and maritime trade,
with periodic valleys caused
by overproduction and low
prices. The industrial and
shipbuilding Northeast used
massive amounts of southern
“hard” pine in bridges,
wharves, shipbuilding, and
houses. Turpentine, pine tar,
pitch, and rosin were
exploited from the lumber.
In 1942, the South
Carolina State Ports Authority
took over responsibility for
the Georgetown port, and
after World War II it worked to
improve shipping access. The
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
completed deepening of the
Winyah Bay channel to 27
feet in 1951, and the
Georgetown port began a
revival that continues today.
Today, South Carolina’s sea trade is peaking again. Can we sustain momentum this time?
South Carolina’s maritime traderevived in fits and starts afterWorld War II. The Charleston
Navy Yard had expanded in the late 1930s
as the federal government got ready for
war, then mushroomed after Japan
attacked Pearl Harbor. The U.S. Army
also built a large embarkation port north
of Charleston. The old port city was soon
surrounded by military installations, and
thousands of newcomers poured in for
jobs. State leaders meanwhile realized that
South Carolina needed to rebuild its
maritime trade, and in 1942 the General
Assembly created the S.C. State Ports
Authority (SPA). The Ports Authority
enabling legislation mandated develop-
ment of ports in Charleston, Georgetown,
and Port Royal.
After the war, the Ports Authority
received surplus property of the Army
Port of Embarkation north of Charleston,
which became the important North
Charleston Terminal. The authority also
received the crumbling docks in down-
town Charleston. The Ports Authority
upgraded facilities, installed modern
equipment, and established sales offices
in New York to gain new business.
 “The SPA made the difference” in
reestablishing Charleston as an important
port, says Walter Edgar, a historian at the
University of South Carolina. “The port
was no longer just for Charleston. The
port was (rebuilt) to create a pipeline for
the entire state. The SPA, in many cases,
was run by people who were not Charles-
tonians. They were from different parts of
the state.” But the port also benefited
from innovative Charleston mayors, says
Edgar, “who realized that Charleston had
to change.”
During the mid-1960s, thousands of
small and medium-sized manufacturing
firms fled south from northern states
where unions were strong and wages high.
South Carolina, with its anti-union, low-
wage environment, was a beneficiary of
this influx. The state also recruited
multinational corporations from overseas,
which exported goods through Charleston.
The Ports Authority, by then, had
received state appropriations to purchase
additional waterfront property and enlarge
its berthing and storage facilities. The
Ports Authority aimed to catch a techno-
logical wave transforming maritime
commerce: the standardized, six-sided
shipping container. During the 1960s and
1970s, shippers reduced labor costs and
improved efficiency with containerization,
creating a revolution in how goods are
transported around the world.
Today’s container ships are much larger
than ships of the 1950s, and ports can
unload cargo far more quickly than before.
Fifty years ago, it often required several
days’ time to unload or load a ship. Now a
ship can be unloaded or loaded in hours.
Time is money for shipping firms. When
ships are tied up in docks, their owners are
losing out. The most efficient ports win
contracts for further business.
 In 1966, the port handled its first
standardized container, and suddenly after
150 years of maritime decline Charleston
could take full advantage of its port.
One advantage of Charleston’s port is
that it’s nearer the ocean than those in
Savannah, Wilmington, and Jacksonville.
“We’re a seaport, and they’re river ports,”
says Randall Swan, a retired harbor pilot
who began his apprenticeship in 1955. “All
things being equal, if you’re closer to the
ocean, you’re going to save time, and that
gives us a competitive advantage.” Charles-
ton harbor also has a wider channel than
some other southeastern ports. Giant ships
can pass two abreast almost anywhere in
Charleston harbor’s channel; they don’t
have to wait offshore or at the dock for the
channel to clear.
Charleston has become the busiest
container port after New York on the East
and Gulf coasts, and the fourth busiest in
the nation. It’s also one of the most
efficient ports in the world. As a result,
experts say, Charleston draws the best in
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oceangoing vessels—container
ships on a regular line of service.
South Carolina leaders used
long-range planning, practical
management, public investment,
and technological innovation to
make the state’s largest port
successful again. Even so, “people
don’t realize how much we rely on
the port,” says Al Parish, an
economist at Charleston Southern
University. “The port is one of the
top three or four reasons that
manufacturers cite in locating in
South Carolina. The port helps the
state maintain manufacturing jobs
that pay much more than service
jobs and help bring up incomes for
the working class.” International
trade through the Ports Authority
facilities provides more than 83,000
jobs in South Carolina and pumps
$10.7 billion in sales into the state
economy each year.
In 1999, the Ports Authority
proposed a massive expansion plan
for Charleston harbor facilities on
Daniel Island called “The Global
Gateway.” The Ports Authority said
that the expansion was needed to
sustain the growth in trade antici-
pated over the next several decades
and to improve the state’s economy.
But the expansion proposal
angered many lowcountry residents,
who argued that it would harm nearby
neighborhoods. Critics denounced the
Ports Authority as arrogant and
dismissive of community concerns.
The port’s recent success seemed to
alarm many Charleston-area residents
who wanted to put brakes on the
region’s growth.
Citizens seemed most alarmed by
the projected increases in port-related
truck traffic. “When you really got
down to it, the greatest concern was
the impact of the port on the local
highway infrastructure,” says John F.
Hassell, president of Charleston’s
Maritime Association and a member
of the Ports Authority board. Trucks
are a small percentage of metropolitan
traffic, he says, “but trucks are
visible.”
In response to community
criticism, the Ports Authority scaled
back its plan to expand on Daniel
Island. Yet community coalitions
argued that Daniel Island should not
be developed for any port facility,
though the island juts into the harbor,
an ideal location for maritime trade.
Activists called for a port expansion
on the Cooper River’s west bank near
an existing rail system.
Local quality-of-life issues have
often stymied the development of
Charleston’s port. Throughout the
nineteenth century and the first half
of the twentieth century, Charleston
lost trade to other seaports, and the
lowcountry consistently failed to
exploit its maritime potential. Now
some wonder if the Charleston area
could repeat this history.
To historian Edgar, the recent
controversy echoes the Charleston
elite’s attitude toward noisy port-
related traffic in the nineteenth
century. “It’s almost the same thing
as not allowing the train to come to
the docks” from the 1820s to the
1880s, says Edgar.
Earlier this year, the state
General Assembly passed a port
expansion bill that instructed the
Ports Authority to build a container
terminal on the west side of the
Cooper River. The likely site for
expansion is the southern end of the
former Navy Base in North Charles-
ton near existing rail lines.
“Probably the strongest natural
resource that South Carolina has is
Charleston harbor,” says Parish. “If
we aren’t going to take advantage of
it, then our standard of living is
going to go down.”
LEADING THE WAY. Randall
Swan, a retired Charleston harbor
pilot, leans against a piling at the
Cooper River pilot house. “What
Charleston gets today is the cream of
the crop, the best ships, as far as ocean
shipping goes,” Swan says. The port’s
efficiency, wide shipping lanes, and
near-to-ocean facilities have made
Charleston stand out against fierce
competition from other southeastern
U.S. ports.  PHOTO/WADE SPEES
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6th International
Conference on Shellfish
Restoration
Charleston, South Carolina
Nov. 20-24, 2002
This conference will provide an opportu-
nity for government officials, resource
managers, and users to discuss approaches to
restore coastal ecosystems through shellfish
habitat management, and enhancement,
shellfish restoration through watershed
management and community-based strategies
to restore shellfish habitat. Those interested
in participating should visit
http://www.scseagrant.org/icsr.htm.
SUBSCRIPTIONS ARE FREE UPON REQUEST BY CONTACTING: ANNETTE.DUNMEYER@SCSEAGRANT.ORG
Science Serving South Carolina’s Coast
Coastal Zone ’03
Baltimore, Maryland
July 13-17, 2003
The Coastal Zone conference series is the
premier international gathering of ocean and
coastal-management professionals. This biennial
symposium attracts more than 1,200 participants
from around the world. Attend Coastal Zone ’03
to explore coastal-zone management through
time–yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Through
concurrent plenaries, panels, roundtables, and
discussions, participants will gain knowledge they
can use to guide future coastal-management
decisions. For general information, contact Gale
Peek, conference manager, at
Gale.Peek@noaa.gov or (843) 740-1231.
